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The First Amendment and Data Privacy: 
Securing Data Privacy Laws That 





Given the growing ubiquity of digital technology’s presence in 
people’s lives today, it is becoming increasingly more necessary to 
secure data privacy protections.  People interact with technology 
constantly, ranging from when engaging in business activates, such 
as corresponding through emails or doing research online, to more 
innocuous activities like driving, shopping, or talking with friends 
and family.  The advances in technology have made possible the cre-
ation of digital trails whenever someone interacts with such tech-
nology.  Companies aggregate data from data trails and use predic-
tive analytics to create detailed profiles about citizen-consumers.  
This information is typically used for profit generating purposes.  
The way Big Data is being used threatens individuals’ autonomy 
because users of Big Data are becoming increasingly more success-
ful in shifting citizen-consumer’s behaviors to meet the guider’s ob-
jectives. 
This Article discusses the difficulty in enacting laws that protect 
individuals’ data information, as such laws potentially come into 
conflict with the First Amendment’s right to free speech.  This Arti-
cle proceeds to analyze whether data is speech and concludes that 
it is likely speech.  Thus, regulating data information raises First 
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Amendment concerns. Regulating data is in essence regulating peo-
ple’s ability to obtain information.  By preventing dissemination of 
information, freedom of speech has very little value because people 
don’t have the information they otherwise would have obtained.  
Consequently, individuals cannot speak about such information they 
don’t have, and this thus diminishes speech.  Despite finding data 
likely constitutes speech, and thus regulating data poses free speech 
concerns, this Article argues that securing data privacy is necessary 
to safeguard the same objectives freedom of speech protects.  Data 
privacy is necessary to protect the creation of new ideas and differ-
ing opinions because people may self-censor their behavior if such 
behavior is completely exposed to the public.  To ensure the contin-
uance of a citizenry that critically engages in society, data privacy 
is necessary, not just freedom of speech. 
In striking the balance between securing data privacy, while still 
affording a level of freedom of speech that promotes democratic ide-
als, this Article contends data privacy regulations should be ana-
lyzed under the commercial speech doctrine, and thus subject to in-
termediate scrutiny.  Next, this Article argues that the Court should 
uphold data privacy regulations as meeting the requirement of being 
no more restrictive than necessary so long as they pertain to the 
protections common in codes of fair information practices.  These 
protections directly safeguard (1) the use of the data, ensuring use 
is consistent with the purpose of why the data was originally col-
lected; (2) individuals’ right to notice and participate in how their 
data is being used; (3) extra protections for sensitive data pertaining 
to race, sexual orientation, political views, and religion; and lastly, 
(4) a system for enforcement, including available remedies for indi-
viduals who have been wronged.  The Court should uphold data pri-
vacy regulations embodying these protects because they advance the 
government’s substantial interest in preserving autonomy amongst 
individuals in order to protect self-governance.  Further, such reg-
ulations directly are narrowly tailored because they regulate the 
concerns of data privacy that threaten individuals’ ability for self-
determination. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over a century after Warren and Brandeis emphasized the importance of 
privacy in their iconic article The Right to Privacy—in which they argued that 
people have a “right to be let alone”—privacy remains a fundamental concern 
in our society.1  It is becoming increasingly important to establish protections 
to safeguard this right, given the ubiquitous and invasive nature of advanced 
technology.2  Today, technology is present in all aspects of people’s lives, 
ranging from its use for business-related tasks to more innocuous behaviors 
such as watching television, talking with friends and family over the phone, 
online shopping, and even driving.3  As such, it is increasingly more difficult 
to avoid using computerized technology when engaging in society.  It almost 
as if people do not have a choice other than to opt into these modes of engage-
ment to be a productive member of our technology-driven world. 
Advances in technology have made developments such as Big Data4 pos-
sible.  Every time an individual interacts with technology, a data trail is being 
generated.5  This occurs, for example, when using an application on one’s 
phone or wearing a health-monitoring watch.6  Each digital trail of infor-
mation generated is combined with other data sources to produce Big Data.7  
Businesses and organizations analyze Big Data in order to discover patterns 
about individuals, thus resulting in predictive analytics8 used to create detailed 
individual profiles.9  These results are then used by businesses to make 
 
 1. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
 2. This article uses the word “technology” to refer to digital technology, which is defined as 
“electronic equipment and applications that use information in the form of numeric code.  This infor-
mation is usually in binary code.”  Jayden Harmon, What are Digital Technologies?, QUORA (Apr. 
27, 2018), https://www.quora.com/What-are-digital-technologies. 
 3. See Ronald Van Loon, What is Big Data And How Does It Work?, DATA SCI. CTR. (Dec. 12, 
2017), https://www.datasciencecentral.com/profiles/blogs/what-is-big-data-and-how-does-it-work. 
 4. “Big Data” is a generalized and imprecise term but can be used to refer to “the use of large 
data sets in data science and predictive analytics.”  Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due 
Process: Toward A Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014). 
 5. See Van Loon, supra note 3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. “Predictive analytics” is defined as “the practice of extracting information from existing data 
sets in order to determine patterns and predict future outcomes and trends.”  Vangi Beal, Predictive 
Analytics, WEBOPEDIA, https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/P/predictive_analytics.html (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2020). 
 9. Van Loon, supra note 3; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 4, at 93.  
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marketing decisions which can impact individuals’ experiences with the world 
around them.10  The detailed profiles generated do not always produce optimal 
results, however, as the profiles can create an inaccurate picture.11  This can 
cause businesses utilizing Big Data to make misguided decisions because they 
rely so heavily on such data, believing it produces results with greater truth, 
accuracy, and objectivity.12 
Whether or not predictive analytics produce accurate results, Big Data 
practices still violate general privacy concerns.  The implementation of these 
practices infringes on what privacy theorists describe as the right of “control 
over personal information.”13  An example of this type of privacy violation is 
the infamous incident in which the retail chain Target used Big Data to predict 
which of its female customers were pregnant by looking at customers’ pur-
chase histories.14  For instance, if a customer bought items such as unscented 
lotions, scent-free soap, sanitizers, washcloths, or calcium supplements, Tar-
get would assign her a high pregnancy prediction score and would thereby 
increase the amount of  advertising directed at her for baby-related goods.15  
In one case, a teenage girl’s father found out that his daughter was pregnant 
before she was able to tell him because Target persistently sent advertisements 
for baby items to the family’s home.16  Such disclosures are problematic be-
cause they rob individuals of their autonomy in controlling information relat-
ing to intimate details about their personal lives. 
The role that technology plays in almost all aspects of human interactions 
and the resulting ubiquity of Big Data brings to light a concern for information 
 
 10. Van Loon, supra note 3. 
 11. For example, relying on Big Data generated by its search results, Google drastically overesti-
mated peak flu levels compared to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (“CDC”) estimate.  
Declan Butler, When Google got flu wrong, NATURE (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.na-
ture.com/news/when-google-got-flu-wrong-1.12413.  The CDC’s estimates were based off of doctors 
reporting patients’ complaints, whereas Google relied on predicting who had the flu based off of indi-
viduals’ flu-related search results.  Id.  Google’s overestimation can be attributed to more people 
searching for flu symptoms that year, despite being sick, because of the widespread media coverage 
of severe cases.  Id.  
 12. See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 4. 
 13. Scholar Alan Westin describes privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated.”  
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 24 (2008).  
 14. Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out How A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father 
Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-fig-
ured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#129f5aff6668. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  
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privacy.  To address privacy concerns and protect the right to be let alone, 
data privacy laws must be enacted that will withstand constitutional muster by 
not violating the First Amendment.17  This Article argues that data information 
privacy laws should be analyzed under the Commercial Speech Doctrine.18  
Further, in setting the parameters of what regulations withstand intermediate 
scrutiny, this Article suggests that the Supreme Court should recognize laws 
which put into place the protections common in codes of fair information prac-
tices.  The recommended protections would be narrowly tailored, pertaining 
to safeguarding (1) the use of the data (i.e., ensuring use is consistent with the 
purpose of why the data was originally collected);19 (2) individuals’ right to 
notice and participate in how their data is being used;20 (3) extra protections 
for sensitive data pertaining to race, sexual orientation, political views, and 
religion;21 and lastly, (4) a system for enforcement, including available reme-
dies for individuals who have been wronged.22  Laws embodying these pro-
tections should withstand intermediate scrutiny under the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine because they directly regulate the federal government’s concerns. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part II discusses whether data is 
speech, and if so, whether laws regulating information privacy would be sub-
ject to free speech concerns.  Part III discusses the role of the First Amend-
ment in the protection of data information and privacy, concluding that there 
must be a balance between protecting free speech and privacy, because both 
are necessary for traditional American ideals of the Founding Fathers to exist.  
Part IV poses a possible solution to securing information privacy laws that 
withstand constitutional muster by maintaining First Amendment protections 
while honoring the Commercial Speech Doctrine.  Part IV concludes the Ar-
ticle by proposing a plan for the solution’s implementation. 
 
 
 17. U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).   
 18. See generally James B. Franks, The Commercial Speech Doctrine and the First Amendment, 
12 TULSA L. J. 699, 699–700 (2013) (explaining that commercial speech, in other words, speech that 
includes commercial information, such as advertisements, is protectable by the First Amendment).  
 19. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standard for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 
80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 514 (1995). 
 20. Id. at 515. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 515–16. 
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II.  WHETHER DATA IS SPEECH 
When addressing whether a law violates the First Amendment’s guaran-
tee of the right to free speech, one of the first questions that must be asked is 
whether the law in question is targeting speech.  If the law is merely address-
ing conduct, then there is no First Amendment issue.  To this end, there is 
considerable debate among privacy scholars as to whether data constitutes 
speech. 
A. Arguments That Data is Speech 
Some legal scholars, such as Eugene Volokh, take the firm view that data 
is speech.23  Volokh argues that the right to control data information translates 
into “my right to control your communication of personally identifiable infor-
mation about me.”24  This, in effect, creates “a right to have the government 
stop you from speaking about me.”25  Analyzing data privacy laws from this 
perspective makes clear  that such regulations effectively  are inhibiting 
speech.  Volokh rebuts other scholars’ arguments for a code of fair infor-
mation practices (discussed below) by arguing the First Amendment already 
provides fair parameters delineating how data may be disclosed.26  These pa-
rameters favor speech because most of the rules regulating data information 
collection run afoul of the First Amendment.27  Thus, according to Volokh, 
these laws are not defensible.28 
Specifically, Volokh believes that search engine results constitute speech 
and therefore are protected.29  The modes of communication used by our so-
ciety have changed considerably since First Amendment jurisprudence first 
began to develop.  Volokh notes that while people once turned to newspapers, 
guidebooks, and encyclopedias, today, individuals go to search engines like 
Google for news and other sought-after information.30  In delivering its 
 
 23. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of 
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2000).  
 24. Id. at 1050. 
 25. Id. at 1051. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search Engine 
Results, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 884 (2012). 
 30. Id. 
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consumers news and search query results, Google selects and sorts results in 
a way that each individual user will find the most helpful and useful.31  To do 
this, Google implements a computerized algorithm that prioritizes search re-
sults based off of metrics such as the frequency and location of keywords, how 
long a webpage has existed (giving greater value to pages that have a longer 
established history of being on the web), and the number of webpages that 
link to the page in question.32  Although the traditional newspaper or print-
encyclopedia did not automatically sort its information this way, Google is 
still similar to these predecessor information sources as individuals now turn 
to Google as they once did to newspapers and encyclopedias to gain infor-
mation. 
Agreeing with the two federal cases which held Google’s search engine 
results are protected speech, Search King, Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc.33 
and Langdon v. Google, Inc,34  Volokh argues that automation does not render 
speech unprotected.35  He explains that algorithms are created by people, and 
in the context of search engines, ranking algorithms can be likened to editorial 
judgments.36  Thus, the search engine speech belongs to the corporation, just 
as the speech of what employees of a corporate newspaper create or select 
belongs to the newspaper corporation.37  Secondly, Volokh explains that First 
Amendment protection not only focuses on a speaker’s rights, but also pro-
tects the rights of listeners and readers.38  Automation is necessary in provid-
ing users with “free, convenient, quick, and comprehensive access” and con-
sequently only increases the value of speech to the user.39 
Volokh’s search engine analysis can also apply to Big Data and data in-
formation generally.  Similar to search engine rankings, Big Data can likewise 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.; Jonathan Strickland, How Google Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Dec. 20, 2006), https://com-
puter.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/google1.htm. 
 33. The district court held that Google was protected from liability for tortious interference with a 
contractual relationship for allegedly lowering Search King’s ranking on Google’s search engine, be-
cause Google’s search ranking constitutes protected speech.  See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., 
Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).  
 34. The district court held that Google has the First Amendment right to not post certain website 
ads, likening Googles decision to an editorial judgment.  Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 
622, 622 (D. Del. 2007). 
 35. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 29, at 886, 888. 
 36. Id. at 888–89. 
 37. Id. at 889. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 888–89. 
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constitute speech because humans create the algorithms for data-mining soft-
ware, just as humans created Google’s ranking algorithm.  Further, the 
knowledge provided to users of Big Data is as useful as the information the 
ranked search results provide to users of search engines.  Individuals who 
search on a search engine access an abundance of information that may, in 
effect, change their perspective and inform their decisions.  Big Data also in-
forms the actions of those individuals analyzing it.40  Big Data gives users 
access to information detailing patterns about individuals, enabling users to 
make their decisions based off of such behaviors. 
Companies, rather than individuals, are typically the entities that imple-
ment algorithms to track and sort data, and they use that data to create reports 
predicting users’ behavior, oftentimes for marketing purposes.41  This benefits 
the company because their tailored individualized approach to marketing can 
increase profits. 
The right to create knowledge is another theory that supports the propo-
sition that data information is speech.42  Professor Jane Bambauer argues that 
data must be speech because two of the latent prerequisites to free speech are 
free thought and information flow.43  Like Volokh, Professor Bambauer points 
out that the First Amendment has been interpreted to protect the person re-
ceiving the message, and not just the speaker.44  The logic behind this is that 
if the government could regulate thoughts by restricting access to information, 
free speech would have very little value.45 
Professor Bambauer also analyzes the protection of data as speech as be-
ing consistent with the marketplace of ideas.46  The marketplace of ideas is a 
theory that justifies the protection of free speech through the notion that there 
should be an open marketplace for the exchange of ideas, where bad ideas 
eventually lose out to good ones.47  This “marketplace of ideas” promotes the 
 
 40. See Jeff Desjardins, Here’s What the Big Tech Companies Know About You, VISUAL 
CAPITALIST (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/heres-what-the-big-tech-companies-
know-about-you/. 
 41. See Richard Wheaton, Why retailers need to embrace cloud computing for growing sales, THE 
DRUM (July 29, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2019/07/29/why-retailers-need-
embrace-cloud-computing-growing-sales.  
 42. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 86–87 (2014). 
 43. Id. at 86. 
 44. Id. at 87. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 91–96. 
 47. Id. at 92. 
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free competition of the minds of Americans.48 
Professor Bambauer argues that data has the power to change minds and 
thus belongs in the marketplace.49  For example, she explains that this type of 
data changed beliefs about the cause of ulcers.50  Historically, it was believed 
that stress caused ulcers.51  Some courts even accepted evidence that a plaintiff 
suffered from an ulcer as proof of a physical manifestation of stress as re-
quired to win damages in intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.52  
However, this belief was dismantled when scientists discovered a type of bac-
terium common to all who suffered from ulcers that could survive in stomach 
acid.53  When patients were treated with antibiotics for their ulcers, rather than 
simply resting, the patients were cured 900% more often.54  Ultimately, access 
to data information in the marketplace of ideas is what led to changing the 
belief that stress causes ulcers, and access to this information can further lead 
to other beneficial discoveries. 
B. Arguments That Data is Not Speech 
Unlike Professor Bambauer, Professor Neil Richards instead argues that 
distinctions should be drawn between speech and information flows.55  He 
suggests that data privacy and the First Amendment can be reconciled because 
most laws regulating data are regulating conduct, not speech.56  Professor 
Richards states that regulations for the use, collection, and disclosure of per-
sonal data are often introduced as a code of fair information practices.57  One 
of the first enacted codes of fair information practices, The Privacy Act of 
1974,58 was passed to regulate federal agencies and has been influential in 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 93. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 
1149, 1166 (2005). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits federal agencies from disclosing personal information re-
trieved from federal systems of records without the written consent of the individual the information 
pertains to, unless the disclosure is pursuant to one of the twelve statutory exceptions.  See U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, Privacy Act of 1974, https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 (last visited Jan. 17, 
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providing a framework to pass additional state and federal laws regulating the 
private sector.59  There is a general consensus among scholars that these codes 
typically guarantee four protections against the misuse of data.60 
The first protection that the codes of fair information practices ensure is 
the implementation of standards for data quality, which requires data to be 
collected lawfully and used for specific purposes.61  The data collector must 
use the data only for purposes compatible with the original intent of collecting 
the data, which restrains inappropriate secondary uses.62 
Second, these codes provide standards for the transparency of information 
processing.63  The core element of this standard is to have the individual par-
ticipate in the treatment of their personal information.64  In sum, information 
processing must be transparent to all citizens.65 
Third, the codes create special protections for sensitive data.66  Such data 
that warrants extra scrutiny by citizens includes information relating to race, 
religion, health, or political beliefs.67 
Finally, these codes also address the enforcement of fair information prac-
tices.68  For the regulations to work, there must first be supervision and over-
sight of the treatment of individuals’ information.69  Additionally, there must 
be remedies for those who have been wronged.70 
Professor Richards adopts Professor Paul Schwartz’s view that a majority 
of regulations in a code of fair information practices actually govern conduct 
and do not target speech.71  Professor Schwartz argues that out of the four 
protections provided by a code of fair information practices, the first, second, 
and fourth protections do not implicate speech at all.72  Rather, those 
 
2020). 
 59. Richards, supra note 55, at 1166–67. 
 60. Id. at 1167. 
 61. Reidenberg, supra note 19, at 514. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 515. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 515–16. 
 69. Id. at 515. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Richards, supra note 55, at 1168; Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: 
Eugene Volokh’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1561–62 (2000).  
 72. Id. 
[Vol. 2019: 51] The First Amendment and Data Privacy 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
62 
provisions merely regulate business practices or conduct.73 
Professor Schwartz does acknowledge, however, that the third protec-
tion—preventing the disclosure of sensitive data—does burden free speech.74  
He admits that this subset does fit into Volokh’s view of “information privacy 
as the right to stop people from talking about you.”75  Consequently, prevent-
ing the disclosure of sensitive data likely violates the First Amendment.  How-
ever, Professor Richards and Professor Schwartz would argue that although 
regulations of the disclosure of sensitive data may burden speech, most of 
these regulations address conduct and thus do not pose free speech concerns.  
Therefore, they would justify most of these regulations in a code of fair infor-
mation practices. 
Presenting an alternative view, Professor Tim Wu argues that data pro-
duced by computers is not speech and that the First Amendment is only in-
tended to protect humans.76  He rejects the court’s decision in Search King, 
Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc., as he disagrees that Google’s rankings of 
search results, which are derived from algorithms, constitute speech.77  He 
refutes the analogy posed by Volokh, likening Google’s algorithms to an edi-
tor of a newspaper, by stating: “Socrates was a man who died for his views; 
computer programs are utilitarian instruments meant to serve us.”78 
Professor Wu urges that the First Amendment’s intended purpose was to 
protect humans against the evils of state censorship, not to protect commercial 
automation from regulation.79  Again, Professor Wu uses an analogy in refut-
ing the notion that algorithms are speech because they were programmed by 
people with First Amendment rights.80  He equates giving algorithms consti-
tutional rights to Dr. Frankenstein’s monster having the right to vote, just be-
cause he is able to walk and talk.81  Professor Wu therefore urges against com-
puters being able to inherit constitutional rights.82 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1562. 
 76. Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012), https://www.ny-
times.com/2012/06/20/opinion/free-speech-for-computers.html. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
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C. Data is Likely Speech 
Scholars on both sides of the issue have posed convincing arguments as 
to why data is or is not speech.  Volokh and Bambauer argue that the First 
Amendment protects not only the speaker’s rights, but also the rights of the 
person receiving the information.83  If there are laws curtailing the gathering 
of information, this harms the would-be user of the information because it 
prevents him or her from ever gaining that knowledge. 
However, Richards, pointing to other scholars’ work, argues data infor-
mation laws regulate conduct and not the dissemination of speech.84  Further, 
Wu argues the First Amendment is meant to protect people, not commercial 
automation.85  The key in finding which of these principles should be adopted 
is to discern how far before the actual utterance of speech should be protected 
in order to safeguard free speech rights. 
As Bambauer points out, allowing the free flow of information is con-
sistent with most of the theories behind why the First Amendment exists.86  
From a marketplace of ideas perspective, not restricting data information col-
lection is in line with the search for truth.87  Individuals must be able to receive 
information in order to engage with others in search of the best ideas.  Further, 
the right to receive data information corresponds with the notion that free 
speech serves to protect democratic participation, particularly dissident opin-
ions.88  Having the right to access information protects the critical thinking 
necessary for self-governance. 
The Court has also recognized protection must be afforded to not just 
speech, but what comes before speech.  Justice Brandeis, an advocate for pri-
vacy, even supported the notion that knowledge is essential to free speech, 
stating, “[t]hose who won our independence believed . . . that freedom to think 
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery 
and spread of political truth.”89  In sum, being able to receive information 
presupposes knowledge and being knowledgeable is a prerequisite to speech. 
In Branzburg v. Hayes, although the Court did not grant the press 
 
 83. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 29, at 889; Bambauer, supra note 42, at 87. 
 84. Richards, supra note 55. 
 85. Wu, supra note 76. 
 86. Bambauer, supra note 42, at 91–106. 
 87. See Frederick Schauer, Must Speech be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285 (1983). 
 88. Bambauer, supra note 42, at 97. 
 89. Id. at 97-98; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). 
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immunity from being compelled to testify and reveal confidential news 
sources, the Court still acknowledged journalists are afforded extra protec-
tions in order to safeguard the free flow of information.90  In pertinent part, 
the Court stated, “[w]e do not . . . [suggest] that news gathering does not qual-
ify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out 
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”91  This statement can be 
analogized to the idea that without the right to receive information, freedom 
of speech could be eviscerated. 
Given the Court’s history with securing rights necessary for speech, it is 
likely that data information constitutes speech.  The Court affirmed this belief 
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., by rejecting the argument that a law prohibiting 
the sale of medical information, revealing the prescriptions doctors have pre-
scribed patients, did not regulate speech but simply access to information.92  
The Court reasoned, based on a long history of precedent, that “[a]n individ-
ual’s right to speak is implicated when information he or she possesses is sub-
jected to ‘restraints on the way in which the information might be used’ or 
disseminated.”93 
Going forward, the Court will likely follow its precedent and treat data 
information as speech.  However, like in Branzburg where the Court did not 
afford the press unlimited privileges in the name of preserving free speech, 
the Court should strike a balance and not allow the unfettered disclosure of 
data information.  Such unregulated information disclosures can certainly cur-
tail democratic objectives. 
III.  INFORMATION PRIVACY IS CENTRAL TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 
Looking at the history behind why the Founding Fathers secured the right 
to free speech is illuminating on the topic of information privacy.  Free speech 
was, and still is, meant to protect the democratic process of self-governance.  
However, some level of privacy is necessary to preserve a self-governing so-
ciety.  Although finding the balance can be difficult, it is necessary. 
 
 90. Bambauer, supra note 42 at 85; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).  
 91. Id.  
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A. Historical Purpose of the First Amendment 
The First Amendment was adopted to protect the individual liberty of cit-
izens and create a democracy where such individuals directly participate in 
governmental affairs by directly voting on issues and electing representative 
officials.94  On December 19, 1791, only four days after the Bill of Rights was 
ratified,95 James Madison stated in the National Gazette96 that, “[p]ublic opin-
ion sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free 
one.”97  Madison’s ultimate view was that a free country ultimately depends 
on open public opinion.98  He believed that those who tried to suppress opin-
ions through restrictions on speech were opponents of democracy.99 
The notion that a democratic society should guard free speech in order to 
allow differing opinions for the purpose of protecting liberty stems back to 
the Enlightenment period.100  Since antiquity, laws have existed that prohib-
ited expressing or even believing in differing views or opinions.101  For exam-
ple, many conflicting social and political opinions were outlawed because ei-
ther the church or the state viewed them as dangerous or false.102 
By 1275, legislation prohibiting the freedom of speech existed in Eng-
land.103  Laws against seditious libel were also enacted, which prohibited crit-
icism of the government.104  Further, there existed laws against blasphemous 
 
 94. See Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” Revisited, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 1003, 
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libel, prohibiting criticism of religion.105  Less than a century later, the 1351 
Treason Act was codified, making it a crime to “compass or imagine” the 
death of the king.106  All these laws aimed to  suppress opinions that differed 
from the political or religious entity in power. 
Political philosophers who sparked the Enlightenment, including John 
Locke, opposed the suppression and intolerance of differing opinions.107  
Locke and the Enlightenment teachings influenced the Founding Fathers to 
establish the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights.108  In addi-
tion to the Founding Fathers, John Stuart Mill was also heavily influenced by 
the teachings of Enlightenment-era philosophers.  Mill was inspired by John 
Milton’s theory of the “marketplace of ideas” published in Areopagitica in 
1644.109  In his book On Liberty, Mill expanded on Milton’s idea, explaining 
that every individual has the ability to critically evaluate opinions, and having 
disfavored opinions helps in the search of the truth because they encourage 
the introduction of newer perspectives to into society.110 
Mill’s own theoretical philosophies would ultimately influence Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.111  Justice Holmes’ famous dissent 
in Abrams v. United States introduced the marketplace of ideas theory into the 
Court’s analytic framework, emphasizing the Constitution’s protections of the 
free trade of ideas.112  Holmes stated, “the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”113 
The marketplace of ideas has become an influential theory of the rationale 
behind the First Amendment.  It is clear that the Enlightenment teachings ad-
vocating the dissemination of differing opinions influenced the Constitution, 
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ian.com/law/2014/oct/17/treason-act-facts-british-extremists-iraq-syria-isis. 
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B. Granting Some Protection to Data Privacy is Necessary for the 
Democratic Process 
Given the history behind the rationale of free speech—beginning with the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment, then followed by Founding Fathers and 
early Supreme Court jurisprudence—it is clear that the First Amendment at 
its core is supposed to protect differing opinions.  By protecting differing 
opinions and introducing all ideas into the open market, individuals are able 
to more critically engage in society.  Ideas are introduced and fleshed out 
through rational discussion.  Further, having an intelligent and participatory 
citizenry is necessary for the self-governance that the Founding Fathers envi-
sioned.  For a government “by the people for the people” to operate effec-
tively, its populace must be able to engage freely in discussion and express 
unpopular opinions, prompting the free exchange in ideas, so that eventually 
the truth or the best idea prevails. 
The same rationale that justifies free speech—to allow the citizenry to 
cultivate thoughts and disseminate differing opinions for the search of good 
ideas to strengthen their democracy—also justifies a level of privacy that must 
be afforded to all people.  Big Data poses a heightened threat to privacy be-
cause almost every action a person engages in is documented through the cre-
ation of data trails.114 
Professor Bambauer, who argues that data is speech, addresses the con-
cerns regarding the inherent tension that on the one hand, data allows individ-
uals to access information and become better informed, but on the other hand, 
if everything is on display, people may not engage in certain activities.115  
Self-censorship may take place, which can have the same detrimental effect 
as prohibiting speech.  Individuals may not engage in certain activities that 
they otherwise would have if their data was not being tracked and used.  As a 
result of not engaging in certain ventures, individuals, consequently, will not 
critically wrestle with the knowledge they would have gained.  Thus, individ-
uals will not have the opportunity to contribute their would-be new and en-
lightened ideas to the marketplace. 
To put this idea into more concrete terms, let’s say an individual, Abby, 
 
 114. See Tim Henderson, States battle big tech over data privacy laws, GCN (July 31, 2019), 
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wants to learn more about terrorism and wants to conduct online research as 
to how the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) uses propaganda to recruit 
members.116  However, Abby is afraid of how her search data will be used by 
third parties and is worried she may get flagged by The U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security for suspicious activity.117  She does not want to deal with 
the consequences of investigators searching through all her personal data or a 
potential police visit to her home. 
Consequently, Abby does not want to go to direct sites where ISIS prop-
aganda is disseminated.  She instead restricts her inquiry of ISIS’s propaganda 
to secondary sources that she considers safe and not directly connected to 
ISIS, such as the New York Times and Washington Post websites. 
If Abby had visited the sites that ISIS uses directly to disseminate its mes-
sages, she would have been able to gain insightful information firsthand on 
how ISIS tries to connect with those who may be vulnerable, willing recipients 
to ISIS propaganda.118  She was not able to receive this illuminating infor-
mation through the secondary sites because it was dulled down and somewhat 
censored.  If Abby had directly seen ISIS’s propaganda, it may have enabled 
her to grapple with what she saw and read.  She then could have possibly come 
up with counter-content to gain the attention of those visiting propaganda sites 
and perhaps saved lives.  In this hypothetical, Abby would not have been able 
to come up with her meaningful counter-message if she had not seen the con-
tent first-hand. 
Abby’s fear of being flagged as a threat by searching suspicious content 
is not irrational.  The U.S. government has, in recent years, engaged in “flag-
ging” individuals as security threats for simply inquiring into certain infor-
mation online.119  In 2013, the Guardian released a story about how the Unites 
States National Security Agency (“NSA”) used a system called XKeyscore, 
to search for suspicious activity through vast databases containing emails, 
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online chats, and browsing history of millions of people.120  In Abby’s case, 
the NSA could have flagged specific keywords through XKeyscore to uncover 
Abby’s ISIS-related search activity, then subsequently gained access to and 
searched all of her personal digital information—despite the fact that she was 
not a real terrorist threat. 
Additionally, police may have also paid a visit to Abby’s home because 
of her internet search history.  Another Guardian article stated that a woman 
and her family were visited by counterterrorism police because they were 
flagged for suspicious activity relating to their internet searches.121  The 
woman had searched online about a pressure cooker.122  Her husband had 
searched about getting a backpack.123  Together with their son’s online reading 
habits, which entailed clicking on links about popular terrorism news stories, 
the family was flagged for suspicious terrorist activity.124  Consequently, the 
woman stated that if she ever bought a pressure cooker, she would not do so 
online.125  This illustrates that having one’s private information searched or 
being paid a visit by investigators to one’s home can prevent a person from 
engaging in enhancing one’s knowledge, a valuable tool in a democracy. 
In addition to self-censorship, another risk posed by the lack of data pri-
vacy is that data analytics will actually reduce exposure to competing ideas.126  
This decline can occur through data analytics assessing an individual’s data 
pertaining to politics and news sources, then using the data to suggest other 
news sources that that individual will like based on their political viewpoint.  
This decreases an individual’s exposure to news sources with differing per-
spectives and creates an “echo chamber” exposing individuals only to view-
points that align with their own.127 
Professor Julie Cohen  has voiced her concerns about echo chambers, af-
firming that they do not foster political dialogue among diverse 
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perspectives.128  She explains that the purpose of Big Data is to “produce trac-
table, predictable citizen-consumers whose preferred modes of self-determi-
nation play out along predictable and profit-generating trajectories.”129  Big 
Data analysts can then subtly nudge citizen-consumers via advertisements into 
directions that correspond with profit-maximizing goals.130 
Professor Cohen argues that decisions made by today’s citizens, with Big 
Data predicting their paths for them, do not “resemble the independent deci-
sions, formed through robust and open debate, that . . . liberal democracy re-
quires to sustain and perfect itself.”131  This Big Data infiltration of privacy 
has enabled commercial and government actors to render individuals as fixed, 
transparent, and predictable.132  Without some privacy, individuals become 
predictable and can be more easily guided in the direction commercial or gov-
ernment actors want, and the First Amendments policy objectives will be ren-
dered useless.  This diminishes critical thinking among individual citizens, the 
emergence of differing ideas, and, ultimately, threatens the form of self-gov-
ernance envisioned by the Founding Fathers. 
IV.  A SOLUTION FOR PROTECTING DATA 
A. Lack of Transparency in First Amendment Law 
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech is a murky133 area of law 
that seems to receive inconsistent treatment by Supreme Court Justices.  Both 
the Court and legal scholars have acknowledged that not all speech is pro-
tected.134  Justice Holmes notably declared in Schenck v. U.S. that “[t]he most 
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stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting 
fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”135  In his opinion in Frohwerk, written 
only a few days after the Schenck decision, Holmes expanded on Schenck by 
stating that the First Amendment was not “intended to give immunity for 
every possible use of language.”136  Despite the consensus that the First 
Amendment does not afford protection to all speech, there is still much con-
fusion about its scope.  The question of its scope becomes particularly difficult 
when freedom of speech is at odds with other generally accepted societal val-
ues.137 
Historically, in determining the scope of First Amendment protection for 
freedom of speech, the Court balanced the value of speech against the social 
harm it caused.138  The Court carved out categories of low-value unprotected 
speech by performing a balancing test that was based on intuition rather than 
any data or hard facts.139  In part, through balancing, the Court created the free 
speech exceptions of fraud, obscenity, and true threats.140  Further, in estab-
lishing the low-value category of fighting words, the Court applied a balanc-
ing test, reasoning such words “are of such slight social value . . . that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”141 
However, because of the administrative unpredictability that comes with 
an ad hoc balancing approach, recently the Court has shifted to a more rules-
based approach in its low-value speech analysis.142  In United States v. Ste-
vens, the Court rejected the government’s argument to use a balancing ap-
proach in order to uphold a law criminalizing the creation, sale, or possession 
of certain depictions of animal cruelty.143  Although the Court acknowledged 
that the government’s argument did not arise out of a vacuum—because the 
Court had used balancing approaches in the past—it nevertheless rejected the 
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government’s approach.144  The Court instead implemented the historical test 
in carving out unprotected categories of speech, basing its analysis on whether 
the categories of speech at issue have been “historically unprotected.”145  The 
Court reiterated that this was always the approach to recognizing a category 
of low-value speech, despite using a balancing analysis with other catego-
ries.146 
Because the Court has been unclear on how to determine the scope of the 
First Amendment’s protection, crafting a solution that will afford data infor-
mation privacy is difficult.  It is not evident whether the Court will at any point 
revert back to a more equitable balancing approach, weighing the value of the 
speech against the harm posed.  Further, with regard to future application of 
the current historical test, it is unclear how far the Court will go in using his-
torical analogies to render decisions.  For example, will the Court allow for 
more creative, modern arguments that were likely not considered by the 
Founding Fathers upon the enactment of the First Amendment?  Or, does the 
specific harm have to have existed during the founding of the United States?  
Because of the lack of clarity concerning how to render certain speech unpro-
tected under the First Amendment, this Article takes the position that the most 
feasible approach for enacting data privacy regulations is to use the Commer-
cial Speech Doctrine. 
B. History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The Commercial Speech Doctrine, though firmly established, comes with 
its own set of issues that could lead to confusion.  Like with the First Amend-
ment, the Court has been unclear about the scope of the doctrine.  When the 
doctrine was first introduced, the Court said that commercial speech was fully 
unprotected speech.  However, the Court later stated that commercial speech 
is somewhat protected and is subject to intermediate scrutiny.  Despite this 
lack of consistency within the Commercial Speech Doctrine, it still seems to 
be the best solution for data information privacy. 
The Commercial Speech Doctrine originated in 1942, when the Court, in 
Valentine v. Chrestensen, held that commercial speech was an unprotected 
category of speech.147  In this case, F.J. Chrestensen owned a former United 
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States Navy submarine which he brought to a New York City pier.148  
Chrestensen allowed the public to tour the vessel in exchange for an admission 
fee.149 Chrestensen passed out a double-sided handbill on the streets, with one 
side advertising the vessel, but the other side protesting against the department 
in charge of the dock.150  He created the double-sided handbill because he was 
trying to advertise his tours without violating a New York sanitary code, 
which prohibited distribution of commercial material in the street.151  After 
Chrestensen was charged in violation of the code, he argued the code violated 
his First Amendment right to free speech.152 
The Court upheld New York City’s code, reasoning that the Constitution 
does not constrain the government from regulating purely commercial adver-
tising.153  The Court further explained that it would be up to legislative judg-
ment to determine whether and to what extent someone “may promote or pur-
sue a gainful occupation in the streets.”154  The Court’s opinion did not parse 
out the content of Chrestensen’s handbill to see how much of it was commer-
cial speech, because Chrestensen intentionally added the other information 
only to try to convert his speech into non-commercial speech.155 
However, in 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc. (Virginia State Board), the Court departed from 
its ruling that commercial speech is completely unprotected and instead found 
it be partially protected.156  In Virginia State Board, consumers of prescription 
drugs brought an action to strike down a law prohibiting pharmacists from 
advertising the price of prescription drugs.157  The Court held that the regula-
tion was unconstitutional and in violation of the First Amendment.158  The 
Court reasoned that commercial speech is not so far removed from the expo-
sition of ideas so as to render it unprotected.159  The Court then explained how 
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price information on prescription drugs may be information more useful to the 
receiver than “the day’s most urgent political debate.”160  Prescription drugs 
are often very expensive and inability to compare prices harms the poor, sick, 
and aged.161  Finally, the Court stressed that purely commercial speech may 
still be of public interest.162 
In 1980, the Court expanded on the Commercial Speech Doctrine and set 
out the doctrine’s current test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission of New York (“Central Hudson”).163  There, Central 
Hudson challenged a law that prohibited advertising that promoted the use of 
electricity.164  The Court adopted and applied a four-step test and found that 
the law was unconstitutional.165  The Court laid out the test as follows: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected 
by the First Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within that 
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mislead-
ing.  Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is sub-
stantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest.166 
The Court applied this analysis to the regulation in question.  First, the 
Court determined the commercial speech fell under the protection of the First 
Amendment because it did not relate to unlawful activity, and it was not mis-
leading.167  As to the second factor, the Court determined that the government 
has a substantial interest in conserving energy.168  For the third factor, the 
Court concluded that the state’s interest was directly advanced by the regula-
tion because advertising is directly connected to demand.169  The Court rea-
soned that Central Hudson would not be fighting this ban if it did not believe 
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that advertising would increase sales.170  However, the Court found that the 
regulation failed factor four.171  Finally, in applying the fourth factor, the 
Court found that the government failed to prove that a more limited regulation 
could not serve the same interests it had in conserving power.172 
Most recently, as mentioned in Part II, the Court’s controversial decision 
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. struck down a law which prohibited the sale, 
disclosure, or use of information about doctors’ prescribing habits for market-
ing purposes.173  The majority opinion analyzed the constitutionality of the 
law under heightened scrutiny because the regulation was content-based.174  
However, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s decision to apply a higher 
standard.175  Justice Breyer argued that the First Amendment does not require 
extra heightened scrutiny when the government’s regulation burdens speech 
in an effort to regulate the commercial industry.176  Breyer called the height-
ened scrutiny applied by the majority in commercial speech cases “unprece-
dented.”177  The dissent argued that the regulation should have been analyzed 
under intermediate scrutiny and upheld for meeting the standard.178 
C. Regulating Data Privacy Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Despite the lack of transparency regarding First Amendment free speech 
jurisprudence, and even the commercial speech doctrine, the most feasible 
way to tackle the data privacy issue is with the Supreme Court’s most recent 
four-step test. 
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as speech that pro-
poses a transaction.179  The sale and use of consumer data for marketing pur-
poses falls into the category of commercial speech.  The Court has defined 
commercial speech as speech that proposes a transaction.180  The data-mining 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 569–570. 
 172. Id. at 570.  
 173. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
 174. Id. 563–64, 566 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
 175. Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 177. Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 178. Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 179. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. (“Central Hudson”), 447 U.S. 
557, 562 (1980). 
 180. See, e.g., id. at 562. 
[Vol. 2019: 51] The First Amendment and Data Privacy 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
76 
industry primarily exists to sell consumer data to third parties or directly use 
the data it has collected for marketing purposes, ultimately, in order to enter 
into a transaction for the sale of consumer goods or services.  In both scenar-
ios, profits are being made based off of the data information collected from 
consumers. 
Regulating data information collection through the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine may not directly address the hypothetical posed earlier where Abby 
self-censored herself by not visiting terrorist-affiliated websites out of fear she 
would be flagged.  However, by addressing data information privacy in the 
commercial context, the widespread trails of information produced by private 
actors would be reduced. 
Consequently, less information would be available for the government to 
tap into.  Regulating private search engine’s use and sale of consumer data 
information collection would not only diminish other private companies from 
using such information for commercial purposes, but it would also prevent the 
government from gaining access to use it for its own purposes. 
Further, if the government wants to create its own data trails directly and 
use that information, the legislature can directly regulate this because such 
laws would be regulating the government itself.  There are no First Amend-
ment issues at play when the government regulates its own speech.  Therefore, 
data privacy protection through applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
would prevent the government and commercial industries from having unlim-
ited and unrestricted access to the that data citizen-consumers produce online. 
Moving forward, the Supreme Court should analyze the constitutionality 
of data information regulations relating to marketing by applying the Central 
Hudson test.  First, the Court should determine whether the commercial 
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.181  Assuming the speech 
is lawful and not misleading, it will fall within First Amendment commercial 
speech protection.182 
For the second factor, the Court should recognize general privacy con-
cerns for citizens as a substantial governmental interest.183  As explained in 
parts 1-III, if there are no safeguards to online privacy and everyone is con-
stantly exposed, democracy itself is threatened. 
Regarding the third factor, the Court must address whether the law at 
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issue directly advances the government’s substantial interest.184  If the law is 
prohibiting the dissemination or use of certain data information, it will directly 
advance the government’s substantial interest in securing the privacy of U.S. 
citizens.  Limiting the disclosure and use of data prevents would-be Big Data 
users from obtaining personal information about individuals that Big Data us-
ers would consequently use to make predictions about such individuals. 
If U.S. citizens are going to be afforded any data information privacy, the 
last factor is where legislatures and the Court should take extra care.  The 
fourth factor requires that the regulation at issue be no more extensive than is 
necessary to serve the government’s interest.185  To clarify this point, the Court 
has not interpreted this to require the least restrictive regulation as possible, 
but rather requires a rational balance between the government’s end and the 
means chosen to achieve it.186  This can be “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, 
but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but 
one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served . . . .’”187  Thus, the 
Court can uphold a data information regulation even if it is not the least re-
strictive means possible for securing the government’s interest in preserving 
citizens’ information privacy. 
In the future, legislatures and the Court should delineate what is “not more 
extensive than is necessary” to mean data privacy laws that directly pertain to 
securing the four protections common in codes of fair information practices.  
Regulation of data information should constitute a reasonable fit where the 
scope of the protection proportionate to the interest it is meant to serve.  These 
laws will likely pass constitutional muster if such regulations pertain to pro-
tecting: (1) the use of data consistent with the reason for collecting the data;188 
(2) individuals’ right to notice and the ability to participate in how their infor-
mation is being used;189 (3) sensitive data pertaining to race, sexual orienta-
tion, political views, and religion by providing more protections;190 and (4) 
available remedies for individuals who have been violated pursuant to the 
three principles just listed.191 
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By following these principles, laws should constitute a reasonable fit—
and pass the commercial speech test employed by the Supreme Court—be-
cause their scope is proportional to the substantial public interest served in 
protection the privacy of U.S. citizens online. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the increased role that technology plays in individuals’ lives today, 
it is necessary for the Supreme Court to afford some level of protection to-
wards the disclosure and use of personal data information.  Today, individuals 
are constantly interacting with technology and are largely not afforded the 
option to “opt out” of these modes of engagement in professional, social, and 
political settings. 
The ubiquity of technology creates an increasing threat to privacy and 
diminishes the welfare of the populace.  Specifically, the objectives behind a 
robust First Amendment—the constant introduction and proliferation of com-
peting ideas and a participatory citizenry that critically engages in self-gov-
ernance—are threatened if privacy protections are not implemented for indi-
viduals online.  People will be less informed and rendered predictable, 
consequently becoming pigeonholed into their foreseeable place in society.192  
Thus, it is necessary for courts in the U.S. to recognize the significant govern-
ment interest in preserving privacy for the U.S. citizenry and upholding laws 
that reasonably advance this interest. 
The most feasible way to achieve data information privacy is through the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine.  Laws regulating data likely regulate speech, 
and the First Amendment has been interpreted not only to protect speech, but 
also the ideas that form before speech and, consequently, make speech possi-
ble.  Therefore, data is likely speech and laws regulating data also regulate 
speech.193 
A huge commercial industry exists around data mining and using Big 
Data to increase profits.  Clearly, the commercial industry is involved because 
behind all the information gathered from consumer data, commercial transac-
tions are being proposed.  These transactions are either to sell the data itself 
or use the data directly in order to sell goods or services. 
Ultimately, the government has a significant interest in preserving a level 
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of privacy amongst citizens so that the United States can continue to function 
through democratic self-governance.  The time is ripe for the Court to view 
future laws enacted to secure the protections embodied in codes of fair infor-
mation practices as a reasonable fit to achieving the government’s ends in 
preserving privacy. 
 
